AboutI am Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Experimental Epistemology Research Group, and Member of the Center for Cognitive Science at the University at Buffalo (SUNY).
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My primary research interests are in epistemology and experimental philosophy. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature and extent of human knowledge, rationality, and evidence. Experimental philosophy uses the tools of the cognitive and social sciences to shed light on topics of perennial philosophical debate.
Within epistemology I have written about (i) skeptical challenges to our pretensions to know a good deal about the world and how best to respond to them, (ii) reliabilism (an epistemological theory that says the frequency of objectively getting things right is all that matters for knowledge and rationality), and (iii) a priori knowledge (knowledge that is obtained by the exercise of human reason independently of the use of the senses).
Within experimental philosophy, I've investigated (i) how moral judgments about people's actions affect judgments about how much knowledge those people have, (ii) crosscultural differences in people's intuitions about the meaning of proper names, (iii) whether people think moral judgments are objectively true or are more subjective and culturally variable, and (iv) what scientists from different disciplines think about the objectivity of science.
I have recently been awarded a $234,000 research grant from the John Templeton Foundation to study the philosophy and psychology of epistemic autonomy and its relation to intellectual humility. The three year project (which will run from July, 2020, to June, 2023) will be carried out in collaboration with philosopher Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida) and psychologist Joshua Wilt (Case Western Reserve University). Our team will draw upon recent scholarship within philosophy on the nature of intellectual virtue to deepen our understanding of how to balance a healthy reliance upon our own reasoning and decision making with a robust awareness of the fallibility of our cognitive capacities. On the one hand, overestimating our intellectual abilities and achievements can lead us to dismiss the testimony of peers and experts when they disagree with us, closing us off to potentially valuable information. On the other hand, focusing too much on our intellectual limitations and weaknesses can result in insufficient self-trust and an excessive deference toward the opinions and reasoning of others. Knowing how to balance intellectual self-reliance with intellectual humility can be especially difficult when navigating contentious public debates that are marked by increasing polarization and massive amounts of misinformation that are disguised as fact.
Our team will construct a self-report measure of individual differences in epistemic autonomy and demonstrate how this measure relates to existing measures of intellectual humility, arrogance, and other virtues and vices of the mind. We will also host an international conference on epistemic autonomy at the University of North Florida (Spring, 2021, pandemic-permitting) and a public forum in Buffalo, NY (Fall, 2022) to engage the public in dialogue about ways that the cultivation of epistemic autonomy, intellectual humility, and related intellectual virtues can help individuals productively navigate contentious public debates that are marked by increased political polarization, pervasive distrust of experts, and misinformation.
Within epistemology I have written about (i) skeptical challenges to our pretensions to know a good deal about the world and how best to respond to them, (ii) reliabilism (an epistemological theory that says the frequency of objectively getting things right is all that matters for knowledge and rationality), and (iii) a priori knowledge (knowledge that is obtained by the exercise of human reason independently of the use of the senses).
Within experimental philosophy, I've investigated (i) how moral judgments about people's actions affect judgments about how much knowledge those people have, (ii) crosscultural differences in people's intuitions about the meaning of proper names, (iii) whether people think moral judgments are objectively true or are more subjective and culturally variable, and (iv) what scientists from different disciplines think about the objectivity of science.
I have recently been awarded a $234,000 research grant from the John Templeton Foundation to study the philosophy and psychology of epistemic autonomy and its relation to intellectual humility. The three year project (which will run from July, 2020, to June, 2023) will be carried out in collaboration with philosopher Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida) and psychologist Joshua Wilt (Case Western Reserve University). Our team will draw upon recent scholarship within philosophy on the nature of intellectual virtue to deepen our understanding of how to balance a healthy reliance upon our own reasoning and decision making with a robust awareness of the fallibility of our cognitive capacities. On the one hand, overestimating our intellectual abilities and achievements can lead us to dismiss the testimony of peers and experts when they disagree with us, closing us off to potentially valuable information. On the other hand, focusing too much on our intellectual limitations and weaknesses can result in insufficient self-trust and an excessive deference toward the opinions and reasoning of others. Knowing how to balance intellectual self-reliance with intellectual humility can be especially difficult when navigating contentious public debates that are marked by increasing polarization and massive amounts of misinformation that are disguised as fact.
Our team will construct a self-report measure of individual differences in epistemic autonomy and demonstrate how this measure relates to existing measures of intellectual humility, arrogance, and other virtues and vices of the mind. We will also host an international conference on epistemic autonomy at the University of North Florida (Spring, 2021, pandemic-permitting) and a public forum in Buffalo, NY (Fall, 2022) to engage the public in dialogue about ways that the cultivation of epistemic autonomy, intellectual humility, and related intellectual virtues can help individuals productively navigate contentious public debates that are marked by increased political polarization, pervasive distrust of experts, and misinformation.